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Abstract
Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconﬁdent in the sense
that they overestimate the accuracy of their private information, judgment and
intuition. In this paper we present a novel evolutionary foundation for overconﬁ-
dence: diversiﬁcation of risk. In addition, the model explains various stylized facts
that characterize overconﬁdence. Finally, an equivalent formulation of the model
illustrates why principals may prefer overconﬁdent agents in various strategic (non-
evolutionary) interactions.
Key words: overconﬁdence, diversiﬁcation, evolution.
1 Introduction
In many experimental studies participants are asked to answer trivia questions, and to
report the level of conﬁdence (subjective probability) that they answered each of these
questions correctly. The typical result in such experiments is that people are overconﬁdent:
their conﬁdence systematically exceeds the true accuracy (see Section 2). That is, people
tend to overestimate the accuracy of their private information, personal judgment and
intuition. Various evidence suggest that overconﬁdence substantially inﬂuences economic
behavior of analysts (Friesen and Weller, 2006), investors (e.g., Berber and Odean, 2001),
entrepreneurs (e.g., Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, 1988; Koellinger, Minniti and Schade,
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2007), managers (e.g., Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Goel and Thakor, 2008; Gervais, Heaton
and Odean, 2010), and consumers (Grubb, 2009).
In this paper, we present a theoretical model that studies the relation between overconﬁ-
dence and risk diversiﬁcation. The main application of the model is a novel evolutionary
foundation for overconﬁdence. We show that overconﬁdence is a unique evolutionary sta-
ble behavior, and we characterize its optimal level. Our model has two key properties that
distinguish it from existing evolutionary models for overconﬁdence : (1) the evolutionary
dynamics is based only on individual selection (and not on group selection as in Bernardo
and Welch, 2001), and (2) overconﬁdence achieves the optimal solution to the evolution-
ary problem (and not a second-best adaptation that compensates for another bias as in
Blume and Easley, 1992; Waldman, 1994; and Wang, 2001).
An equivalent representation of the model describes the strategic interaction between
a risk-averse principal and privately informed agents, and illustrates why the principal
prefers overconﬁdent agents over rational agents. This may help understanding why it
seems that successful analysts, entrepreneurs and managers tend to have high levels of
overconﬁdence.
1.1 Model and Results
The equivalent strategic representation allows us to illustrate our model and to intuitively
explain our results in a simpler manner than the evolutionary representation. Therefore,
we ﬁrst describe the strategic representation, and postpone the presentation of the evolu-
tionary framework to the next subsection. Our model describes the strategic interaction
between a risk-averse principal and privately informed agents. 2 As an illustrating exam-
ple, consider the following strategic interaction in a venture capital fund.
Example 1 A risk-averse CEO of a venture capital fund hires several analysts. When the
CEO chooses which analysts to hire, he observes the conﬁdence level of each candidate.
Each analyst manages the investments of the fund in his area. For simplicity, assume that
each analyst investigates several startup companies, and chooses one of these companies.
The analyst may base his choice on two methods: (1) follow the accepted guidelines and
make the choice a typical analyst would in such a situation, or (2) be original and follow
his own personal judgment and intuition. The fund invests money in the chosen startup
company. This investment may either succeed or fail. Successes of diﬀerent agents are pos-
itively correlated if both analysts follow the accepted guidelines, and they are independent
otherwise. The analyst is interested in maximizing the success probability of his invest-
ment. The CEO wishes to maximize the total number of successful investments, and each
additional success has a smaller marginal payoﬀ.
2 In the evolutionary framework (as discussed in the next subsection) the agents are the indi-
viduals in the population, and the evolutionary dynamics behaves as if it were a risk-averse
principal.
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Our model (Section 3) includes a principal and many agents. Each agent i is characterized
by bias function gi that determines how he evaluates the accuracy of personal judgment
and intuition: if his judgment is correct with probability 0 < pi < 1, the agent believes
the accuracy to be gi (pi). The strategic interaction includes two stages. At stage 1 the
principal observes the bias functions of potential agents, and chooses which agents to hire.
At stage 2, all agents publicly receive signal 0 < q < 1 - the success probability of following
the accepted guidelines. 3 4 In addition, each agent i privately receives signal 0 < pi < 1
(evaluated as gi (pi)) - the success probability of following his own judgment (each pi is
independently drawn from the same distribution.). Then each agent chooses whether to
follow the accepted guidelines or to follow his own judgment. Each agent who follows the
accepted guidelines succeeds with probability q; success of diﬀerent agents who follow the
accepted guidelines are positively correlated with correlation coeﬃcient 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Each
agent i who follows his own judgment succeeds with probability pi independent of other
agents, An agent receives high payoﬀ if he succeeds and low payoﬀ if he fails. The payoﬀ
of the principal is a concave increasing function of the total number of successful agents. 5
Following the accepted guidelines bears a larger aggregate risk due to the positive correla-
tion between the successes of diﬀerent agents. This creates a conﬂict of interests between
calibrated agents (gi (pi) = pi) who maximize their probability of success, and the risk-
averse principal. The principal has a tradeoﬀ between two objectives: (1) maximizing the
expected number of successes, and (2) reducing the variance in the number of successes.
The ﬁrst goal is fully consistent with the interests of calibrated agents. However, due
to the second goal, the principal would like agents with pi a little bit smaller than q to
follow their somewhat less accurate personal judgment, in order to reduce the variance
and achieve a better diversiﬁcation of risk among the agents.
Our ﬁrst result (Theorem 3) shows that if the number of agents is suﬃciently large,
then this conﬂict is optimally resolved by hiring overconﬁdent agents. 6 That is, there is
a continuous and increasing bias function g∗, which always overestimates the perceived
accuracy of agent's personal judgment (g∗ (p) > p for every 0 < p < 1, see Figure 1 in
Section 3), such that if all agents have this bias function, it approximately induces the
ﬁrst-best outcome for the principal - the outcome he would achieve if he could receive
all the private signals and directly control the actions of all agents. We further show
(Theorem 4) that g∗ is unique in the following sense: all other bias proﬁles, including
heterogeneous proﬁles in which agents have diﬀerent bias functions, induce strictly worse
3 We assume that all agent who follow the accepted guidelines have the same success probability
q in order to simplify the presentation of the results and make the model more tractable. The
results would remain qualitatively similar if each agent who follows the accepted guidelines has
an independent success probability qi.
4 The assumption that the public signal is evaluated without a bias is without loss of generality
as discussed in Subsection 6.2.
5 In addition, we make the technical assumption that this utility has decreasing absolute risk
aversion - see Subsection 3.1.
6 The conﬂict can also be resolved by using monetary incentives. In Section 5 we demonstrate
why in some situations the overconﬁdence mechanism may be easier to implement than a
mechanism that is based on monetary incentives.
3
outcomes. Our third result (Theorem 6) presents interesting comparative statics. It shows
that the principal prefers more overconﬁdent agents if: (1) he becomes more risk-averse,
or (2) the correlation coeﬃcient ρ becomes larger. The intuition of both results is that
both changes deepen the conﬂict of interests between the principal and calibrated agents,
and more overconﬁdence is required to compensate it. As demonstrated in Example 5,
when the number of agents is small, our results do not hold.
1.2 Evolutionary Application
We now present the main application of our model. Consider a large population of agents
with several genetic types. Each type i induces a (possibly random) bias function gi for
its members. In each generation, each agent faces an important decision that inﬂuences
his ﬁtness. When taking this decision the agent may either follow the accepted guidelines
(do what most people think to be best in this situation) or follow his own judgment and
take an original action. At the beginning of each generation each agent i receives two
signals 0 < pi < 1 and 0 < q < 1 with the same interpretation as in the basic model: pi is
the independent success probability of following agent's judgment, and q is the positively
correlated success probability of all agents that follow the accepted guidelines.
In each generation, each agent chooses whether to follow his own judgment or the accepted
guidelines, and this leads either to a success or to a failure in terms of ﬁtness (expected
number of oﬀspring). The size of each type in the next generation is determined by
replicator dynamics (the new size of each type in the next generation is their size in the
previous generation multiplied by their average ﬁtness) with a small mutation rate (each
individual in the new generation has a small probability to be randomly assigned into a
new type.).
We are interested in the following question: which type will survive in the long run? A
simple adaptation of existing results in the evolutionary literature shows that with high
probability in the long run a unique type prevails over the entire population: the type that
maximizes the logarithm of the average ﬁtness in each generation. 7 That is, the limiting
behavior that is induced by the evolutionary dynamics is the bias proﬁle that is directly
chosen by a risk-averse principal with a logarithmic utility function.
The fact that the principal's utility is logarithmic, 8 allows us to characterize additional
comparative statics on the optimal level of overconﬁdence. First, we show (Theorem 7)
that the optimal level of overconﬁdence is higher if there is a larger diﬀerence between the
ﬁtness in case of a success and the ﬁtness in case of a failure. This result is in accordance
with the experimental ﬁnding of Sieber (1974) which suggests that people tend to be
more overconﬁdent with respect to more important decisions (experimental ﬁndings and
stylized facts are discussed in Subsection 2.2).
7 In Section 4 we formally adapt Robson (1996)'s result to our setup. See also related results in
Lewontin and Cohen (1969), McNamara (1995), and the ﬁnancial paper of Samuelson (1971).
8 It is enough to assume that the principal has a constant relative risk aversion utility.
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Theorem 7 also shows that the optimal level of overconﬁdence is higher if the success prob-
abilities tend to be lower (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance). This result is in accordance
with a stylized fact about overconﬁdence - the hard-easy eﬀect (Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ,
and Phillips, 1982). According to this eﬀect, the more diﬃcult the task, the greater the
observed overconﬁdence.
Finally, Theorem 7 shows that when the potential gain is large enough and ρ and pi are
close enough to 1, then the perceived error probability of personal judgment (1− g∗ (pi))
is much smaller then the true error probability (1−pi). This ﬁts the experimental stylized
fact of the false certainty eﬀect (Fischhoﬀ, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977): people are
often wrong when they are certain about their private information.
Our model implies that all evolutionary histories induce overconﬁdence, but that there
is a large variety in the level of induced overconﬁdence given diﬀerent histories. This
implication is in accordance with the experimental ﬁndings about levels of overconﬁdence
in diﬀerent cultures, as surveyed in Yates et al. (2002).
1.3 Related Literature
Most related work is the literature studying evolutionary foundations for overconﬁdence.
We discuss this literature in the following paragraphs. In Section 2 we discuss other related
papers.
Waldman (1994) showed that second-best adaptations can be evolutionarily stable with
sexual inheritance, even though they need not be the optimal solution to the evolutionary
problem. In particular, He demonstrated that the combination of overconﬁdence (over-
estimating self-ability) with excess disutility from eﬀort is a second-best adaptation.
Similarly, Blume and Easley (1992) and Wang (2001) presented models in which the
combination of overconﬁdence and excess risk aversion (or too high discount factor) are
second-best adaptations. Contrary to that, in our model overconﬁdence induces the
optimal outcome, and does not compensate for other errors.
In Bernardo and Welch (2001)'s model a small proportion of individuals are overconﬁdent,
while the rest of the population are calibrated. Being overconﬁdent reduces the ﬁtness of
the individual, but it substantially improves the ﬁtness of his group, by inducing positive
information externality in a cascade interaction. Under the assumption that the evolu-
tionary dynamics combines both group and individual selection, the evolutionarily stable
proﬁle includes a minority of overconﬁdent individuals. Contrary to that, our model only
relies on individual selection, and it does does not include information externalities.
Recently, Louge (2010) independently presented a closely-related evolutionary model, and
he showed that the evolutionary stable behavior has two overconﬁdence-related properties:
(1) a bias towards actions that defy common wisdom, and (2) more extreme public
information is required before disregarding private information. Louge applied this rule
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to cascade interactions and demonstrated that herds eventually arise, but the probability
of herding on the wrong action is lower than with a rational rule. Our model diﬀers
from Louge (2010) in a few aspects: (1) we also deal with strategic (non-evolutionary)
interactions of economic interest; (2) our model explains various stylized facts about
overconﬁdence; and (3) we allow for partial correlation between agents who follow the
public signal, and we allow the private signals to be costly (see Subsection 6.3).
1.4 Structure
Section 3 presents the model and the results (all proofs are given in the appendix). The
main evolutionary application of our model is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents
a few more applications of our model, including: (1) the interaction between investors
and entrepreneurs, and (2) an example that shows how overconﬁdence can increase social
welfare. Section 6 presents a few variants and extensions of the basic model, and discusses
its key assumptions: (1) we relax the assumption that the number of agents is exogenously
given, and we show that the principal always prefers to multiply the number of agents;
(2) we allow agents to have bias also with respect to the success probability of following
the accepted guidelines, and we show that our results essentially remain the same; (3) we
extend our results to a setup where private information is costly, and each agent has to
privately invest eﬀort in improving the accuracy of his personal judgment; (4) we show
that our results also hold when agents are informed experts who recommend the principal
which action to choose; and (5) we show that our results hold also when the agents are
more risk averse than the principal; and (6) we show that our model can be reformulated
to capture overconﬁdence as underestimating the variance of a continuous noisy signal (as
often modeled in ﬁnance papers).
2 Related Literature
The term overconﬁdence has been widely used in psychology since the 1960s, and in the
economics and ﬁnance literature since the 1990s. Google Scholar reports on 876 papers
that include this term in their titles and about 40,000 papers that include it anywhere
in the text (September 2010). In this section we brieﬂy discuss a small portion of this
literature. We ﬁrst describe the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of overconﬁdence and the main ex-
perimental and empirical ﬁndings about it (Subsection 2.1). Next, we describe a few
experimentally observed stylized facts about overconﬁdence (Subsection 2.2). Finally, we
describe related economic and ﬁnancial models which deal with overconﬁdence (Subsec-
tion 2.3).
The interested reader is referred to the following surveys on overconﬁdence: the classical
survey of Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ and Phillips (1982), which summarizes overconﬁdence
literature in the 1960s and 1970s; the survey of Griﬃn and Brenner (2004) that summarizes
the theoretical controversies about overconﬁdence, and the recent survey of Skala (2008).
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2.1 Deﬁnitions of Overconﬁdence and Experimental Literature
The term overconﬁdence has three diﬀerent deﬁnitions in the literature. The most pop-
ular deﬁnition (and the one used in this paper) describes overconﬁdence as a systematic
calibration bias, for which the assigned probability that the answers given are correct
exceeds the true accuracy (see e.g., Oskamp, 1965; Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ and Phillips,
1982; Brenner et al., 1996; Dawes and Mulford, 1996). Overconﬁdence usually emerges
when the uncertainty regarding the true answer is generated by the state of knowledge
of the agent - internal uncertainty (Howell and Burnett, 1978; Kahneman and Tversky,
1982). For example, the question: Is Mont Blanc the tallest mountain in Europe?. In
such cases, the agent has partial cues and private noisy signals about the correct answer,
and using his personal judgment and intuition, he tries to evaluates the accuracy of his
preferred answer. As implied by the experimental evidence, in such cases agents tend to
overestimate their accuracy. When the source of uncertainty is external to the agent (e.g.,
tossing a coin or the outcome of a future football game) the tendency for overconﬁdence
is substantially weaker (see, e.g., Budescu, and Du, 2007).
The second deﬁnition of overconﬁdence deals with excessive certainty regarding the ac-
curacy of one's beliefs about an uncertain continuous quantity. Researchers examining
this eﬀect typically ask their participants questions with numerical answers (e.g., How
long is the Nile River?), and then have participants estimate (usually 90%) conﬁdence
intervals. Overconﬁdence is measured by the rate of surprises, i.e., the percentage of true
values falling outside the conﬁdence intervals. The typical ﬁnding (see Lichtenstein, Fis-
chhoﬀ and Phillips, 1982; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992) is that people tend to present
substantial overconﬁdence: 90% conﬁdence intervals contain on average only 50% of the
true values. 9
The third deﬁnition of overconﬁdence describes the phenomenon in which people believe
themselves to be better than average. A review of this literature can be found in Alicke and
Govorun (2005). A typical ﬁnding in this literature is the oft-quoted ﬁnding of Svenson
(1981) that 77% of Swedish subjects felt they were safer drivers than the median. This
bias is closely related to overly positive self-evaluations and to over-optimism about the
future. Taylor and Brown (1988) report such phenomena to be positively correlated with
diﬀerent criteria of mental health. Recently, Moore (2007) and Benoit and Dubra (2011)
suggest that most of the experimental ﬁndings of the better than average phenomenon
can also be explained by a fully-rational Bayesian model.
Training improves overconﬁdence but usually only to a limited extent. Russo and Schoe-
maker (1992) show that asking people job relevant questions reduced overconﬁdence from
50% to 30% (for 90% conﬁdence interval). Weather forecasters, who typically have several
years of experience in assessing probabilities and receiving an immediate feedback, are
9 People also present overconﬁdence for 50% conﬁdence intervals and for free-choice intervals,
but this overconﬁdence is substantially smaller (Soll and Klayman, 2004; Teigen and Jorgensen,
2005).
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quite well calibrated (Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ and Phillips, 1982; and also expert bridge
players - see Keren, 1987). Other experts such as physicians and professional traders,
present substantial conﬁdence biases (see, e.g., Koehler, Brenner and Griﬃn, 2002; Glaser,
Langer, and Weber, 2010).
Empirical data suggests that people present overconﬁdence not only in the lab but also
in real-life situations. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) report the following example: newly
hired geologists were wrong much more than their levels of conﬁdence implied. For in-
stance, they would estimate a 40% chance of ﬁnding oil, but when ten such wells were
actually drilled, only one or two would produce. Berber and Odean (2001) show that
men, which are generally believed to be more overconﬁdent than women in areas such as
ﬁnance, trade more excessively than women, and this excess trade substantially reduces
net returns. Henrion and Fischhoﬀ (2002) show that scientists systematically underes-
timate uncertainty in their own measurements of physical constants. Chuang and Lee
(2006) empirically evaluate data on prices of ﬁrms in NYSE and AMEX during 1963-2001
and ﬁnd evidence that investors overestimate accuracy of private information. Similarly,
Friesen and Weller (2006) present empirical ﬁndings that analysts tend to be overcon-
ﬁdent. Recently, Grubb (2009) analyzes consumer tariﬀ choices and usage decisions of
cellular services, and show that the consumers seem to be overconﬁdent in their ability
to estimate their future demand for cellular services. Finally, Ben-David, Graham and
Harvey (2010) demonstrated that ﬁnancial managers overestimate their ability to predict
stock market returns.
2.2 Stylized Facts about Overconﬁdence
The observed overconﬁdence in experiments usually satisﬁes a few recurrent properties
(or eﬀects). In this subsection we describe the main observed properties.
One of the main ﬁndings in the experimental literature is that the degree of overconﬁ-
dence depends on the diﬃculty of the task - the hard-easy eﬀect. The more diﬃcult the
task, the greater the observed overconﬁdence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ, and Phillips, 1982;
Moore and Healy, 2008). A few papers suggest that the hard-easy eﬀect, and apparent
overconﬁdence in general may be the result of choosing unrepresentative hard questions
in experiments (Gigerenzer, Hoﬀrage, and Kleinbolting, 1991; Juslin, 1994), or regression
toward the mean and boundary eﬀects in the presence of unbiased judgmental random
errors (Erev, Wallsten and Budescu, 1994; Soll, 1996; Juslin, Winman and Olsson, 2000).
Recent experiments demonstrate that people still present overconﬁdence (and the hard-
easy eﬀect), though to a less extent, when representative questions are used (which are
randomly sampled from a natural set) and when unbiased judgmental random errors are
taken into account in the analysis (see, e.g., Budescu, Wallsten, and Au, 1997; Klayman
et al., 1999; Glaser, Langer and Weber, 2010).
Another ﬁnding is the false certainty eﬀect : people are often wrong when they are cer-
tain in their private information. In the experiment of Fischhoﬀ, Slovic, and Lichtenstein
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(1977) participants severely underestimated the probability they erred in seemingly easy
questions. Speciﬁcally, the error probability of 10% of the questions was estimated by the
subjects to be extremely low (less than 1:1,000), while the true error probability in these
questions was approximately 10%. The participants had suﬃcient faith in their conﬁdence
judgments to be willing to stake money on their validity.
Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) suggest that many observed patterns of overconﬁdence can be
explained by the strength-weight eﬀect : people focus on the strength or extremeness of the
available evidence with insuﬃcient regard for its weight or credence. This mode of judg-
ment yields overconﬁdence when strength is high and weight is low, and underconﬁdence
when strength is low and weight is high. (Griﬃn and Tversky, 1992, p. 411).
Some experiments (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoﬀrage and Kleinbolting, 1991; Griﬃn and Tver-
sky, 1992) compare people's conﬁdence in giving correct answers by two methods: (1)
each answer is evaluated separately (case-by-case evaluations), and (2) after answering
several questions, participants are asked to evaluate the frequency of correct answers (set-
based evaluations). These papers show that people exhibit less overconﬁdence (or even
underconﬁdence) when evaluating set-based frequencies.
Finally, Sieber (1974) suggests that when the decision is more important, people tend to be
more overconﬁdent. In her experiment, two groups of students were compared. Originally,
both groups were told that they were taking their mid-term examination. However, when
they began the test, one of the groups (group A) was told that it is not mid-term, but
would be used to coach them to mid-term. The two groups had a similar number of correct
answers, but group A presented less overconﬁdence.
2.3 Financial and Economic Models
In this subsection we brieﬂy survey some related ﬁnancial and economic models that
deal with overconﬁdence. Some papers study motivational reasons for overconﬁdence.
Bénabou and Tirole (2002) present a multiple-self model, in which a rational agent tries
to deceive his future self to be overconﬁdent (overestimate his ability), in order to motivate
him to undertake more ambitious goals and persist in the face of adversity. Compte and
Postlewaite (2004) present a model in which positive emotions can improve performance,
and individuals use biases in information processing that enhance their welfare. Köszegi
(2006) and Weinberg (2009) model a decision maker who, in addition to having preferences
over material outcomes, also derives ego utility from positive self-image. In such a setup,
moderate overconﬁdence raises the expected wealth.
Other papers study the evolutionary process that is generated by wealth that ﬂows be-
tween investors in an asset market, and investigate the conditions in which overconﬁdence
can survive or even dominate the market. Blume and Easley (1992) and Wang (2001)
present models in which investors have a high level of risk aversion (or high discount
factor), and overconﬁdent investors can dominate the market due to trading more aggres-
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sively in the right way. Gervais and Odean (2001) show how the tendency for a trader
to take too much credit for successes leads relatively-inexperienced successful traders to
become overconﬁdent. In markets where inexperienced traders continuously enter and
old traders die, there will always be overconﬁdent traders, and these traders will tend
to control more wealth than their less conﬁdent peers. Rabin and Schrag (1999) show
how conﬁrmatory bias (the tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence as conﬁrming the
current hypothesis) induces overconﬁdence.
Van den Steen (2004) models rational overconﬁdence. Agents have an unbiased random
error when evaluating their success probability for each possible action. When such agents
face a choice from a set of alternatives, they are more likely to select actions for which they
overestimate the probability of success. Thus they will tend to be overconﬁdent about the
likelihood of success of the actions they undertake.
A few papers study the inﬂuence of overconﬁdent agents on diﬀerent markets. Odean
(1998) shows that overconﬁdence among investors in ﬁnancial markets increases expected
trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconﬁ-
dent trader. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) show the the presence of some overconﬁdent
agents qualitatively change the equilibrium behavior and the policy implications in insur-
ance markets with asymmetric information.
3 Model and Results
3.1 Model
3.1.1 Parameters of the Model
Our model includes seven parameters: (I, ρ, fq, fp, L,H, h) where:
• I = {1, ..., n} is a set of agents. A typical agent is denoted by i or j.
Each agent faces a choice between two actions: (1) aguidelines, which is interpreted as
following the accepted guidelines, or doing what a typical agent would do in such a
situation; and (2) aoriginal, which is interpreted as following the personal judgment and
intuition of the agent, and making an original choice. Each agent may either succeed or
fail, depending on his chosen action and on the state of nature.
• The number 0 < ρ < 1 is the correlation coeﬃcient between the success of two agents
who follow the accepted guidelines. If at least one of the agents followed his own judg-
ment, then their successes are independent and uncorrelated.
• Distribution fq is a continuous pdf (probability density function) with full support:
∀0 < q < 1, fq (q) > 0. 10 The success probability of all agents who follow the accepted
10 The full support assumption is given to simplify the presentation of the results. The results
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guidelines is the random variable q, which is distributed according to fq.
• Distribution fp is a continuous pdf with full support. The success probability of each
agent i who follows his own judgment is the random variable pi, which is distributed
according to fp.
• L,H ∈ R (H > L) are the payoﬀs an agent may obtain: success yields high payoﬀ (H)
and failure yields low payoﬀ (L). In the strategic (non-evolutionary) interactions (such
as, Example 1) one can assume that H = 1 and L = 0. In the evolutionary application
described in the next section, H (L) is the ﬁtness of a successful (unsuccessful) agent.
• h : [L,H]→ R is a strictly concave increasing function that satisﬁes decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). That is: (1) h′ > 0, (2) h′′ < 0, and (3) Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion rA (x) = −h′′(x)h′(x) is decreasing in x. 11 The function h is interpreted
as the utility of the risk-averse principal (described below).
3.1.2 State of Nature
The unknown state of nature determines the value of the tuple of random variables(
q, (pi)i∈I , ξq, (ξi,p, ξi,q)i∈I
)
∈
(
[0, 1]× [0, 1]I × {0, 1} × ({0, 1} , {0, 1}) I
)
:
• As described earlier, q ∼ fq and each pi ∼ fp. The variables
(
q, (pi)i∈N
)
are indepen-
dent.
• Variable ξq is equal to 1 with probability q (and 0 otherwise). Whenξq = 1 (ξq = 0) the
accepted guidelines are relevant and updated (irreverent or obsolete).
• If ξq = 1 (ξq = 0 ) then each ξi,q is equal to 1 with high probability: √ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
(with low probability:
(
1−√ρ
)
· q) and equal to 0 otherwise. Following the accepted
guidelines would yield agent i high (low) payoﬀ whenξi ,q = 1 (ξi ,q = 0).
Observe that without conditioning on the value of ξq the success probability of following
the accepted guidelines is q. That is, for each q ∈ [0, 1]: m
P (ξi,q = 1|q = q) = (1− q) · (1−√ρ) · q + q · (√ρ+ (1−√ρ) · q) = q.
Also observe that conditionally on q, the correlation coeﬃcient between the successes of
each two agents i, j who follow the public signal is ρ. That is, for each q ∈ [0, 1]:
are qualitatively unaﬀected by relaxing this assumption.
11 The DARA assumption is not required for Theorem 3 (parts 1,2 and 4) and for Theorem 4. It
is required for part 3 of Theorem 3 and for the comparative statics (Theorem 6).
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ρ (ξi,q, ξj,q|q = q) = E (ξi,q · ξj,q|q = q)− E (ξi,q|q = q) · E (ξj,q|q = q)√
var (ξq,i|q = q) · var (ξq,i|q = q)
=
q
(√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)2
+ (1− q)
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)2 − q2√
q (1− q) q (1− q)
=
qρ+
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)2
+ 2q2
√
ρ
(
1−√ρ
)
− q2
q (1− q)
= =
(
1−√ρ
)
q2
(
1 +
√
ρ
)
+ qρ− q2
q (1− q) =
−ρq2 + qρ
q (1− q) = ρ.
• For each i ∈ I, ξi,p is equal to 1 with probability pi (and 0 otherwise). When ξi ,p = 1
(ξi,p = 0) the personal judgment of agent i is correct (incorrect), and following it would
yield agent i high (low) payoﬀ.
Variables (ξi,q, ξi,p)i∈N are independent conditionally on (q, ξq), and variables
(
ξq, (ξi,p)i∈N
)
are independent.
3.1.3 Strategic Interaction
The strategic interaction between the principal and the agents includes two stages. At
stage 1 the principal (who has no information on the state of nature) chooses a proﬁle
of bias functions (gi)i∈I . Each function gi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] determines the bias of agent i
when estimating the accuracy of his own judgment. That is, if the true success probability
of following personal judgment is pi, then agent i mistakenly believes it to be gi (pi).
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The choice of the bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I is interpreted as follows: there is an inﬁnite pool of
potential agents with all possible bias functions. The principal can observe these biases,
and choose |I| agents with any given proﬁle of bias functions. 13 The principal is fully
rational and knows all aspects of the model. Each agent has bounded rationality, and he
is not aware that he has a conﬁdence bias. 14
Remark 2 The assumption that the principal can choose the bias proﬁle ﬁts well the
evolutionary application (described in the next section). The assumption is very simplistic
when considering strategic interactions (such as, Example 1). However, the intuition and
main implications of our model can also be applied in a more complicated setup where the
principal cannot choose the optimal bias proﬁle, but can only approximate it by choosing
a bias proﬁle from a ﬁnite set of feasible proﬁles (e.g., the principal meets several potential
agents, and observes a noisy signal about their conﬁdence biases).
12 See Subsection 6.2 for discussing and relaxing the assumption that agents are biased only with
respect to personal judgment.
13 The number of agents the principal hires is exogenously given in the basic model. In Subsection
6.1 we extend the model to allow the principal to choose the number of hired agents.
14 Such an assumption is in accordance with the ﬁndings of Friesen and Weller (2006) which
suggest that: (1) analysts are overconﬁdent; (2) an analyst is not aware of his own bias; and (3)
an analyst is aware that other analysts tend to be overconﬁdent.
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After stage 1, all agents are publicly informed about the value of q (the success probability
of following the accepted guidelines), and each agent i with bias function gi, is privately
misinformed that the value of pi is gi (pi).
At stage 2 each agent i chooses an action ai ∈ {aguidelines, aoriginal}, where aguidelines
(aoriignal) is interpreted as following the accepted guidelines (personal judgment). The
payoﬀ of agent i is as follows:
ui (aguidelines) =
H if ξi,q = 1L if ξi,q = 0 , and ui (aoriginal) =
H if ξi,p = 1L if ξi,p = 0 ,
Our assumption that fp and fq are continuous guarantee that the inequality q 6= g (pi)
holds with probability 1. Thus, each bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I induces a strictly dominating
strategy proﬁle for each agent i: following the accepted guidelines if q > gi (pi), and
following the personal judgment if q < gi (pi).
15 Let ui (gi) = ui (gi,pi,q,ξq , ξi,p, ξi,q) be
the random payoﬀ of agent i who uses this strictly dominating strategy.
The payoﬀ of the principal, u
(
(gi)i∈I
)
, is a strictly concave increasing vN-M (von-Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944) function of the average payoﬀ of the agents (or, equivalently, of
the number of successful agents):
u
(
(gi)i∈I
)
= E(pi )i∈I ,q,(ξi,p,ξi,q)i∈I
(
h
(
1
n
∑
i∈I
ui (gi)
))
.
That is, the principal wishes to maximize the total number of successes, and each addi-
tional success has a smaller marginal payoﬀ.
3.1.4 Auxiliary Deﬁnitions
Bias proﬁle (g∗i )i∈I is -optimal (for  > 0) if it yields the best payoﬀ up to : u
(
(g∗i )i∈I
)
>
u
(
(gi)i∈I
)
−  for every proﬁle (gi)i∈I . Let the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ of the game, be the payoﬀ
that can be achieved by the principal when he obtains all the private signals (pi) and has
full control over the actions of the agents. A bias proﬁle -induces the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ if
its payoﬀ is as good as the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ up to .
Bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I is homogeneous (or symmetric) if all agents have the same bias function:
∀i, j ∈ I, gi = gj. With some abuse of notations, we identify a function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
with the homogeneous proﬁle (g)i∈I . We say that g is an optimal bias function (for a
large number of agents) if, for every  > 0, there is large enough n0 such that, for any
game with at least n0 agents, g is an -optimal proﬁle. Similarly, we say that g induces
the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ (for a large number of agents) if for every  > 0, there is large enough
n0 such that, for any game with at least n0 agents, g -induces the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ.
15 Playing arbitrary if q = g (pi) (a 0-probability event).
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Bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I is heterogeneous if there is a set Q ⊆ [0, 1] with a positive Lebesgue
measure such that, for each q ∈ Q, mini (gi)−1 (q) < maxi (gi)−1 (q). With some abuse
of notation, we identify the bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I with the following bias proﬁle in a game
with k · |I| agents: agents {1, ..., k} have bias function g1, agents {k + 1, ..., 2k} have bias
function g2, ..., and agents {k · (|I| − 1) + 1, ..., k |I|} have bias function g|I|.
3.2 Main Results
The following theorem characterizes the optimal bias function (all proofs are given in
the appendix). It shows that there exists a unique optimal bias function g∗ that reveals
overconﬁdence: g∗ (p) > p for every 0 < p < 1. Moreover, this overconﬁdence bias induces
the principal's ﬁrst-best payoﬀ.
Theorem 3 There exists a unique optimal bias function g∗, which induces the ﬁrst-best
payoﬀ, with the following properties:
(1) Overconﬁdence: g∗ (p) > p for every 0 < p < 1.
(a) g∗ is continuous.
(b) g∗ is increasing: dg
∗(p)
dp
> 0 for every 0 < p < 1, g∗ (0) = 0, and g∗ (1) = 1.
(c) g∗ does not depend on the distribution fq.
The intuition for Theorem 3 is as follows. There is a conﬂict of interest between calibrated
agents (gi (pi) = pi) who maximize their probability of success, and the principal who
wishes some agents with pi < q to follow personal judgment in order to achieve better risk
diversiﬁcation and to reduce the variance of the fraction of successes. The optimal action of
agent i in the principal's ﬁrst-best proﬁle generally depends on the entire realized proﬁle
of signals: (p1, ..,pn,q). However, when there are many agents, the realized empirical
distribution of (p1, ..,pn) is very close to its prior distribution fp. Thus, approximately,
the ﬁrst-best choice of agent i only depends on the realizations of pi and q. Speciﬁcally, for
every q, there is some threshold level g−1 (q) < q such that it is approximately optimal for
the principal if each agent i follows his personal judgment if and only if pi > g
−1 (q). These
thresholds construct the optimal bias function g (p) . This optimal level of overconﬁdence
aligns the preferences of the principal and the agents. That is, the agents behave as if
they have the payoﬀ function of the principal.
Part 4 of Theorem 3 holds due to our simplifying assumption that all agents have the
same success probability when following the accepted guidelines. If agents were facing
diﬀerent values of q when following the accepted guidelines, then the optimal level of
overconﬁdence would also depend on fq.
Figure 1 demonstrates what a typical optimal bias function g∗ looks like. The values
of the parameters are as follows: ρ = 1 (perfect correlation between diﬀerent agents who
follow the accepted guidelines), uniform distribution for the accuracy of the private signal,
payoﬀs are H = 3 and L = 1, and the principal's utility is logarithmic (h (x) = ln (x)).
14
Figure 1. An Example for an Optimal Conﬁdence-Bias Function
Parameters: ρ = 1, H = 3, L = 1, h (x) = ln (x), fp ∼ uniform ((0, 1))
Theorem 3 shows uniqueness in the set of homogeneous bias proﬁles. That is, it shows
that any other homogeneous bias proﬁle induces a worse outcome than g∗, given that the
number of agents is suﬃciently large. Theorem 4 extends the uniqueness also to the set
of heterogeneous proﬁles. It shows that every heterogeneous proﬁle can be replaced with
an homogeneous proﬁle that induces a strictly better outcome, given that the number of
agents is suﬃciently large.
Theorem 4 Let (gi)i∈I be an heterogeneous proﬁle. Then there is k0 ∈ N such that there
is an homogeneous proﬁle that induces a strictly better payoﬀ than (gi)i∈I in the game
with k · |I| agents for every k ≥ k0.
The intuition for Theorem 4 is as follows. Let g be a bias function (an homogeneous
proﬁle) that induces the same expected number of agents who follow the public signal as
the proﬁle (gi)i∈I (for every 0 < q < 1). One can show that on average g induces a strictly
higher success probability for agents who follow their personal judgment. If the number of
agents is suﬃciently large, then the law of large numbers implies that g induces a strictly
better payoﬀ.
Example 5 shows that Theorems 3-4 are not valid when the number of agents is small. It
demonstrates: (1) an asymmetric bias proﬁle that induces higher payoﬀ than the best bias
function; and (2) a ﬁrst-best outcome which is strictly better than what can be induced
by bias proﬁles.
Example 5 There are two agents. The low payoﬀ is zero (L = 0), the high payoﬀ is one
(H = 1). There is perfect correlation between agents who follow the accepted guidelines
(ρ = 1). The distribution of each pi is uniform in (0, 0.5). The principal's utility h (x) is
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2x if x < 0.5 and 1 if x ≥ 0.5. 16 That is, the principal wishes that at least one agent
succeed, and he does not care whether the other agent also succeeds. Consider the case in
which q = 0.7. One can see that the best bias function is one such that (approximately)
g∗ (0.34) = 0.7, 17 and that it induces payoﬀ 0.75. The principal can achieve a higher
payoﬀ of 0.775 by using the following optimal heterogeneous bias proﬁle: one agent always
follows the accepted guidelines while the other agent always follows his personal judgment.
The principal's ﬁrst best payoﬀ is even higher - 0.8, and it is achieved by observing both
p1 and p2, and choosing that the agent with the higher (lower) pi follows his personal
judgment (the accepted guidelines).
3.3 Characterization and Comparative Statics
Our third result (Theorem 6) presents interesting comparative statics. It shows that the
principal hires more overconﬁdent agents if: (1) he becomes more risk-averse, or (2) the
correlation coeﬃcient ρ becomes larger.
Theorem 6 Let (I1, ρ1, fq,1, fp,1, L1, H1, h1) and (I2, ρ2, fq,2, fp,2, L2, H2, h2) be two sets
of parameters of our model, and let g∗1 (g
∗
2) be the unique optimal bias function given the
ﬁrst (second) set of parameters. Then g∗1 presents more overconﬁdence (g
∗
1 (p) > g
∗
2 (p) for
every 0 < p < 1) in each of the following cases:
(1) Utility h1 is more risk-averse than h2 and all other parameters are the same. That
is, h1 = ψ ◦ h2 where ψ is concave and increasing.
(2) The ﬁrst correlation coeﬃcient is larger and all other parameters are the same: ρ1 >
ρ2.
The intuition of Theorem 6 is as follows. If the principal becomes more risk-averse, then he
gives more importance to reducing the variance of the number of successes. This deepens
the conﬂict of interest with calibrated agents, and more induced overconﬁdence is re-
quired to align the preferences of the agents and the principal. Similarly, if the correlation
coeﬃcient becomes larger, this enlarges the aggregate risk that is induced by following
the accepted guidelines, and it deepens the conﬂict of interest between the principal and
calibrated agents.
Figure 2 demonstrates part 1 of Theorem 6. It assumes that the principal's utility has
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA, see next subsection) with parameter θ, and it shows
the optimal overconﬁdence bias (g∗ (p) − p) for diﬀerent levels of relative risk aversion:
θ = 2, θ = 1 (i.e., h (x) = ln (x)), and θ = 0.5. The values of the other parameters in the
ﬁgure are: H = 2, and L = 1, and fp is uniform).
16 To simplify the example, we use a weakly concave and increasing function h and a distribution
fp without full support. The example can be adapted such that h would be strictly concave and
increasing and fp would have full support.
17 (g∗)−1 (0.7) = 0.34 maximizes the expression: F 2 (p0) · 0.7 + 2 · (1− F (p0)) · F (p0) ·
(0.7 + 0.3 ·E (p|p > p0)) + (1− F (p0))2
(
1− (1−E (p|p > p0))2
)
.
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Figure 2. Overconﬁdence (g∗ (p) − p) for diﬀerent risk aversion levels
(H = 2, L = 1, fp ∼ Uni (0, 1))
4 Evolutionary Application
In this section we present the main application of our model, and explain why overconﬁ-
dence is a unique evolutionary stable behavior.
4.1 Model
Consider a large population of agents with several genetic types: (T1, ..., TK). Each type
k induces a (possibly random) bias function gk for its members. In each generation, each
agent faces an important decision that inﬂuences his ﬁtness. For example, choice of oc-
cupation or living area, how to provide food for the family, or how to raise and educate
his children. When making a decision the agent may either follow accepted guidelines (do
what most people think would be best in his situation) or follow his own judgment and
take an original action. At the beginning of each generation each agent i receives two sig-
nals 0 < pi < 1 and 0 < q < 1. These signals have the same interpretation as in the basic
model: pi is the independent success probability of following personal judgment, and q is
the positively correlated success probability of agents who follow the accepted guidelines.
In each generation, each agent chooses whether to follow his own judgment or follow
the accepted guidelines, and this leads either to success or to failure in terms of ﬁtness
(number of oﬀspring): success yields high ﬁtness - H and failure yields low ﬁtness - L.
The size of each type (the number of its members) in the next generation is determined
by replicator dynamics with a small positive mutation rate. That is, basically (without
regarding the mutation rate) the new size of each type in the next generation is their size
in the previous generation multiplied by their average ﬁtness, and their new proportion
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in the population is their new size divided by the new total population size. In addition,
each individual in the next generation has a small chance to be randomly assigned into a
new type.
A well known argument in evolutionary literature (see, Lewontin and Cohen, 1969; McNa-
mara, 1995; Robson, 1996; and the ﬁnance-related paper of Samuelson, 1971) shows that
with high probability in the long run a unique type prevails over the entire population:
the type that maximizes the expectation of the logarithm of the average ﬁtness in each
generation. 18
Formally (adapting the notations of Robson, 1996 to our setup), let ξt = 1 (ξt = 0) be
the event that the accepted guidelines are correct (incorrect) in generation t (denoted by
ξq in the previous section). Recall that P (ξt = 1) = q, and assume that ξt-s in diﬀerent
generations are independent. Let ui,k,t be the ﬁtness of agent i of type k in generation t,
and let mk (ξt) = E (ui,k,t|ξt) be the expected number of oﬀspring produced by an agent
of type k conditional on ξt. Robson (1996, Theorem 2-iii) shows that if mutation rates are
small, a long time elapsed, and the population is found to have avoided extinction, then
the entire population is prevailed by the type that maximizes:
E (ln (mk)) = q · ln (mk (ξt = 1)) + (1− q) · ln (mk (ξt = 0)) .
Observe that due to the law of large numbers, if the population of type k is large enough,
then conditional on the value of ξt, the realized average ﬁtness of the members of type k
in generation t is very close to mk (ξt): mk (ξt) ≈ 1|Tk|
∑
i∈Tk ui,k,t. Thus, Robson (1996)'s
result implies that in the long run nature selects the type that maximizes the expectation
of the logarithm of the average ﬁtness in each generation. Because of this, the long run
limiting behavior that is the result of the evolutionary dynamics can be described as
the bias proﬁle that is directly chosen by a risk-averse principal with a logarithmic utility
function. 19 Thus, in the long run the homogeneous bias proﬁle g∗ is a unique evolutionary
stable behavior, and all of the results of Section 3 hold in this setup as well.
In what follows we sketch out the intuition behind this result. Let nk be the initial number
of members of type k, and let Xt,k =
1
|Tk|
∑
i∈Tk ui,k,t be the average ﬁtness of type k in
generation t. The size of each type Tk after M generations is nk ·X1,k · ... ·XM,k, which is
equal to:
nk ·X1,k · ... · ·XM,k = nk · elog(X1,k·...··XM,k) = nk · elog(X1,k)+...+log(XM,k).
Assume that nk is large enough and that E (log (Xt,k)) > 0, then each Xt,k is approxi-
18 See also Curry (2001) who show that this is equivalent to maximizing the expected relative
number of oﬀspring.
19 See Rayo and Becker (2007) for a discussion why in cases where local and global maxima
coincide (as in our setup), one can replace the study of the evolutionary trial-and-error dynamics
with an optimization problem of a principal with an appropriate utility function.
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mately identically distributed. Assuming that M is large enough then the size of type Tk
afterM generations is approximately (using the law of large numbers): nk ·eM ·E(log(Xt,k)).
This depends only on the expectation of the logarithm of the average ﬁtness in each
generation, and the type that maximizes this expression will expand exponentially faster
than any other type.
At ﬁrst glance, it might be puzzling that our dynamics is entirely based on individual
selection, and yet natural selection does not choose agents who maximize their expected
number of children. This is because natural selection cares for the number of oﬀspring
in the long run. This is not the same as maximizing the short-run expected number of
children. A calibrated agent has an higher expected number of children than an agent with
bias g∗ but he also has a higher variance. Generations in which the realized average number
of children of calibrated agents is small, substantially reduce the number of oﬀspring in
the long run. Due to this, calibrated agents have less oﬀspring in the long run.
4.2 Characterization and Comparative Statics
In the evolutionary application of our model the utility of the principal is determined
endogenously to be a logarithmic utility function. The speciﬁc characteristics of this utility,
or more generally of the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utilities, allows
us to further characterize the optimal level of overconﬁdence. Throughout this subsection
we assume that the utility of the principal satisﬁes CRRA. That is
h (x) =

x1−φ
1−φ if φ > 0, φ 6= 1,
ln (x) if φ = 1,
where the parameter φ > 0 speciﬁes the level of (relative) risk aversion.
Let D = H−L
L
be the (normalized) potential gain: the ratio between the extra payoﬀ that
can be gained when succeeding (H−L) and the minimal guaranteed payoﬀ (L). Theorem
7 shows that CRRA utility yields the following:
(1) The optimal level of overconﬁdence depends on the payoﬀs L and H only through
its dependency on the potential gain.
(2) Larger potential gain induces more overconﬁdence. This ﬁts the experimental ﬁnding
of Sieber (1974), which was discussed in Subsection 2.2.
(3) If the success probability of following personal judgment become smaller (ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance), then it induces more overconﬁdence. This ﬁts the experimen-
tally observed hard-easy eﬀect (Lichtenstein, Fischhoﬀ, and Phillips, 1982): the more
diﬃcult the task, the greater the observed overconﬁdence (as discussed in Subsection
2.2).
(4) When D is large enough and ρ and p are close enough to 1, then the perceived
error probability of personal judgment (1 − g∗ (p)) is much smaller then the true
error probability (1− p). This ﬁts the experimentally observed false certainty eﬀect
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(Fischhoﬀ, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1977): people are often wrong when they are
certain in their private information (as discussed in Subsection 2.2).
Theorem 7 Assume that the principal has a CRRA utility function. Then:
(1) g∗ depends on the payoﬀs only through its dependency on the potential gain D.
(2) If D1 > D2 (and all other parameters are the same) then g
∗
1 presents more overcon-
ﬁdence (g∗1 (p) > g
∗
2 (p) for every 0 < p < 1).
(3) If distribution fp,2 has ﬁrst order stochastic dominance over fp,1 (and all other pa-
rameters are the same) then g∗1 presents more overconﬁdence.
The intuition of the ﬁrst result is that evaluations of alternatives by a principal with CRRA
utility are unaﬀected by scale, and due to this the optimal bias proﬁle depends only on
the normalized potential gain. The intuition of the second result is that larger potential
gain, enlarges the aggregate risk of following the accepted guidelines. This deepens the
conﬂict of interest between the principal and calibrated agents, and more overconﬁdence is
required to compensate for it. The intuition of the third result is that the principal wishes
that agents with the highest success probabilities would follow their personal judgments.
When there is higher probability of receiving lower success probabilities, each accuracy
level pi is more likely to be one of the higher levels.
(1) The ratio between the perceived error probability and the true error probability of
personal judgment (1−g(p)
1−p ) converges to (1/ (D + 1))
φ =
(
L
H
)φ
when both p and ρ
converge to 1.
The last result (false certainty eﬀect) is illustrated in Figure 3. The ﬁgure shows the
perceived error probability and the true error probability of personal judgment for perfect
correlation (ρ = 1) and large potential gain D = 30, and for three prior beta distributions
for the accuracy of the private signals: (1) uniform distribution (α = 1, β = 1, expectation
- 50%), (2) single-peaked distribution around 20% (α = 2, β = 5, expectation - 30%), and
(3) single-peaked symmetric distribution (α = 3, β = 3, expectation - 50%). The ﬁgure
demonstrates the false certainty eﬀect, especially for the two single-peaked distributions:
when the true error probability is 10% the perceived probability is less than 0.5% (1% for
the uniform distribution).
The assumptions that the potential gain is high and the correlation coeﬃcient is close to 1
may seem too extreme. However, one can extend our results into a setup where potential
gain D and correlation coeﬃcient ρ are random variables, and that their joint distribution
has some positive small weight on high values. Each type is assumed to induce a single
bias function g∗ (p) for all values of D and ρ because either: (1) it is too complicated to
induce numerous bias functions g∗ (p|D, ρ), or (2) individuals do not know the realization
of the potential gain and correlation coeﬃcient when they choose their actions. Observe
that for relatively low levels of potential gain D, values of ρ substantially smaller than
1 and low error probabilities (high p-s), the diﬀerence in the type's payoﬀ from either
choosing personal judgment or accepted guidelines is small (both yield a high payoﬀ).
However, when the potential gain D is high and the correlation coeﬃcient is near 1, the
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Figure 3. Perceived vs. True Error Probability (ρ = 1, D = 30)
chosen action has greater inﬂuence on the type's payoﬀ. Thus, for low error probabilities,
the single optimal conﬁdence bias function g∗ (p) would be close to the value of g∗ (p|D,ρ)
of high realizations of D and ρ.
Yates et al. (2002) summarize results from several studies and report that diﬀerent cul-
tures (in particular, Asian and Western) present overconﬁdence, but there is a substantial
diﬀerence in the average level of observed overconﬁdence. This result can be explained by
our model, which predicts that all evolutionary histories would induce overconﬁdence, but
that the optimal level of overconﬁdence will substantially diﬀer among diﬀerent societies
with diﬀerent evolutionary histories. In particular, the optimal level of overconﬁdence
depends on: (1) the typical success probability of following personal judgment, (2) the
correlation between two agents who follow the accepted guidelines, and (3) the typical
potential gain.
5 Applications and Examples
5.1 Strategic Interactions
In this subsection we elaborate and discuss a few examples for the applicability of our
model in strategic interactions of economic interest.
5.1.1 CEO and Analysts (Example 1 Revisited)
Recall that Example 1 demonstrates why a risk-averse CEO prefers to hire overconﬁdent
analysts, who induce better risk diversiﬁcation. The CEO could also solve the conﬂict of
interests with calibrated agents by using monetary incentives. However, implementation of
such incentives would require the agreement of the ﬁrm's shareholders. If the shareholders
are risk-natural (for example, due to having a diversiﬁed portfolio), they would not approve
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such a policy, as they only care for the expected number of successes. On the other hand,
the selection of overconﬁdent analysts can be done by the CEO without formally informing
the shareholders. It is interesting to compare this result with the model of Gervais, Heaton
and Odean (2010), in which, given that the CEO is risk-averse, it is optimal for the risk-
neutral shareholders, if the CEO is overconﬁdent, and overestimates his ability to reduce
risks. 20
With minor changes, Example 1 can also describe the following related strategic interac-
tions: (1) each agent is a local distributor and the principal is a global manufacturer, (2)
each agent is an editor (or a producer) of a publishing company (or a ﬁlm studio), and (3)
each agent is a researcher in a research and development department of a ﬁrm or a non-
proﬁt organization. Observe that in the ﬁrst case (manufacturer and local distributors),
competition with other manufacturers may restrict the plausible contracts between the
manufacturer and the distributors, and limit the ability of the principal to use monetary
incentives to align preferences with the agents.
5.1.2 Investor and Entrepreneurs
Our model can also describe an interesting aspect of the interaction between a risk-
averse angel investor (principal) and several entrepreneurs (agents). The entrepreneurs are
founders of startup companies who work in a similar area. When the investor interviews
the entrepreneurs (before choosing them), he obtains a signal on their conﬁdence-bias.
During the development process, each such entrepreneur may either choose a common
design or an original design for his developed product. The successes of diﬀerent en-
trepreneurs who chose common designs for their products are positively correlated. The
conﬂict of interests between the risk-averse investor and the entrepreneurs can be resolved
either by choosing overconﬁdent entrepreneurs or by using monetary incentives. However,
the latter method may be too expensive: if each entrepreneur holds a large share of his
company, then large monetary incentives are necessary to encourage the choice of origi-
nal designs with smaller success probability.
Our model presents a new explanation why entrepreneurs tend to have high levels of
overconﬁdence (see experimental evidence for this in: Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg,
1988; and Busenitz and Barney, 1997). In addition, it has a unique prediction, which can
be tested in future empirical research: entrepreneurs in areas in which typical investors
are individuals and area-speciﬁc funds would be more overconﬁdent, than entrepreneurs
in areas in which the typical investors are large multi-area funds or a government.
20Goel and Thakor (2008) also study how a risk-averse CEO's overconﬁdence enhances ﬁrm's
value.
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5.2 Overconﬁdence and Social Welfare
Our model can also explain how overconﬁdence can increase social welfare. Consider a
society, where each agent i may either follow accepted guidelines or personal judgment
when deciding how to work. This decision inﬂuences agent i's productivity xi, which may
be either high or low. The payoﬀ of each agent is a function of his output xi and the
total output
∑
j xj: ui = h
(
xi,
∑
j xj
)
. Function h is assumed to be strictly increasing
and concave in both parameters. For example, this is the case if a ﬁxed amount of each
agent's output is taxed and is being used to produce a public good. Alternatively, it might
be that the output of each agent has a direct positive externality on other agents.
Calibrated agents (without conﬁdence-bias) would follow the public signal too often, and
obtain an ineﬃcient outcome, in which the variance of the total productivity
∑
j xj is too
high. A utilitarian social planner would act as if it were a risk-averse principal in our model.
Such a planner would like to induce social norms in favor of moderate overconﬁdence.
This may explain why casual observation suggests that there are social norms in favor
of moderate overconﬁdence (e.g., self trust is the ﬁrst secret of success, Ralph Waldo
Emerson, 1803-1882).
6 Variants and Extensions
6.1 Choosing the Number of Agents
In the basic model we assumed that the number of agents is large. In this subsection we
relax this assumption. Speciﬁcally, we allow the principal to choose the number of agents
he employs, and we show that it is optimal for the principal to hire a large number of
agents.
Proposition 8 shows that the principal strictly prefers to hire k · n agents than n agents.
Proposition 8 For each n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 2 the principal can induce a strictly better
outcome when the number of agents is k · n than when it is n.
The intuition of Proposition 8 is that having more agents enables the principal to achieve
better diversiﬁcation. Each bias proﬁle (gi)i∈I with n agents can be replaced by a similar
proﬁle with k · n agents, in which each bias function gi is induced by k agents. It can be
shown that the random number of successes in the game with k · n agents second-order
stochastically dominates the number of successes in the game with n agents, and thus it
is preferred by the principal.
The following example shows that increasing the number of agents (but not multiplying
it) may be bad for the principal.
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Example 9 (Example 5 revisited) Let L = 0, H = 1, ρ = 1, fp ∼ uniform (0, 0.5),
q = 0.7 and let the principal's utility h (x) be 2x if x < 0.5 and 1 if x ≥ 0.5. Recall that
when there are two agents the principal can achieve payoﬀ 0.775 by using an asymmetric
bias proﬁle: one agent always follows the accepted guidelines while the other agent always
follows his personal judgment. When there are three agents, the principal's best payoﬀ is
only 0.75, and it is achieved by having two agents always follow the accepted guidelines,
and one agent always follows his personal judgment. The intuition why 3 agents are worse
than 2 agents is that, the deﬁnition of utility h implies that the principal mainly cares that
at least half of his agents succeed. It is easier to achieve this objective when there are only
2 agents (1 of them should succeed) rather then when there are 3 agents (and 2 of them
should succeed).
We can use Proposition 8 to demonstrate that our results do not depend on the assump-
tion that there is a single principal. Consider a setup where there are several risk-averse
principals and many agents, and that there is a small marginal cost for each additional
hired agent. Due to the risk aversion of the principals and Proposition 8, each principal
would choose to hire many agents, and all principals would prefer to hire overconﬁdent
agents.
6.2 Bias With Respect to Following the Accepted Guidelines
In the basic model we assume that agents can only have conﬁdence bias with respect to
their personal judgment, but not with respect to the accepted guidelines. In this subsec-
tion, we observe that this assumption is without loss of generality.
Consider a more general model, where the bias of each agent i is described by two functions
(gi,1, gi,2) from [0, 1] to [0, 1], where gi,1 is the bias with respect to the personal judgment
(accuracy pi is perceived as gi,1 (pi)) and gi,2 is the bias with respect to following the
accepted guidelines (accuracy q is perceived by agent i as gi,2 (q)). Observe that the choice
of agent i between the two actions only depends on the composite function (gi,2)
−1 ◦ gi,1.
This is because agent i chooses to follow the accepted guidelines if gi,1 (pi) < gi,2 (q) ⇔
(gi,2)
−1 ◦ gi,1 (pi) < q. This implies that our results remain the same in this extension. In
particular, the optimal proﬁle is such that each agent i has bias functions (gi,1, gi,2) that
satisfy (gi,2)
−1 ◦ gi,1 = g∗, where g∗ satisﬁes all the properties that were characterized in
Theorems 3-6.
Thus one can interpret g∗ as the excess bias in estimating the success probability of
personal judgment relative to the bias in evaluating the success probability of accepted
guidelines. Such an excess conﬁdence bias is related to experimental stylized facts on
overconﬁdence (discussed in Section 2): (1) when following personal judgment most of the
uncertainty is internal, and this induces more overconﬁdence; and (2) it seems plausible
to assume that the evaluation of the success probability of the accepted guidelines is
based on many weak pieces of information: successes and failures of these guidelines
in related decisions of diﬀerent agents in the past; experimental evidence (such as the
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strength-weight eﬀect and set-based evaluations) suggests that such evaluations induce
less overconﬁdence.
6.3 Costly Private Signals
The basic model assumes that private signals are costless. In this subsection we relax this
assumption and extend our results to a more general framework that allows private signals
to have cost. In the extended model, an independent random variable 0 ≤ ti ∼ ft ≤ 1 is
assigned to each agent i ∈ N . Variable ti is interpreted as the eﬀectiveness of agent i in
improving the accuracy of his personal judgment.
After agents are publicly informed about the value of q (the accuracy of following the
accepted guidelines), each agent is privately informed of ti. Then, each agent privately
chooses an eﬀort level 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, and receives private signal pi = p (ei, ti) - the success
probability of following his own personal judgment, where p is a strictly increasing function
(in both parameters), and it is strictly concave in the eﬀort level ei. The payoﬀ of each
agent is either H (success) or L (failure) minus a cost of (H − L) · ei for investing eﬀort
ei. The rest of the model is the same as the basic model.
Let pti ∈ [0, 1] be the unique number that maximizes p (ei, ti)− ei (uniqueness holds due
to concavity). The distribution of eﬀectiveness levels ft induces a unique distribution of
maximizing accuracy levels fpt . The following proposition asserts that our results also
hold in this extended model, where fpt replaces fp.
Proposition 10 The extended model with costly signals admits a unique optimal bias
function g∗, which is the same as the optimal bias function g∗ of the basic model with
fp = fpt.
6.4 Agents as Experts
Consider a variant of the basic model in which at stage 2 each agent recommends an action
(follow accepted guidelines or personal judgment), and the principal chooses the proﬁle
of actions (ai)i∈N based on these recommendations. That is, each agent i is an informed
expert, who advises the principal what to do in his area of expertise. Each expert's payoﬀ
remains the same: high payoﬀ if the recommended action is successful, and low payoﬀ
otherwise.
If all agents are calibrated (g (p) = p), then too many of them would recommend the
principal to follow the accepted guidelines (all experts i with pi < q). The principal can
gain higher payoﬀ relative to the basic model, by violating some of these recommendations.
However, his inability to separate agents with inaccurate private signals (pi is substantially
smaller than q) from agents with relative accurate private signals limits his payoﬀ.
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Observe that this variant yields the same optimal bias function g∗ as the basic model. This
is because agents that follow g∗ induce the principal's ﬁrst-best payoﬀ. Such agents behave
as if they have the same utility as the principal including his interest in diversiﬁcation.
Thus, the principal will always choose to follow the recommendations of such g∗-biased
experts.
6.5 Risk-Averse Agents
In the basic model the utility of each agent is equal to
ui (aguidelines) =
H if ξi,q = 1,L if ξi,q = 0, and ui (aoriginal) =
H if ξi,p = 1,L if ξi,p = 0,
and the utility of the principal is a concave function of the average utility of the agents.
Thus, in the basic model the principal is more risk-averse than the agents (for example,
when there is a single agent, the principal's utility is a concave function of the agent's
utility). This may seem implausible in some applications.
However, this assumption can be relaxed without changing the results as follows (using the
fact that each agent faces only two possible outcomes). We reinterpret ui as a monetary
payoﬀ, and we allow the utility of agent i to be any monotone function of this monetary
payoﬀ: hi (ui). Speciﬁcally, our results (Theorem 3-7) also hold if each agent has utility
function hi (x) that is more concave then the principal's utility h (x).
6.6 Modeling Overconﬁdence as Underestimating Variance
We modeled overconﬁdence as overestimating the accuracy of discrete private signals.
Another common way to model overconﬁdence, especially in ﬁnance models (e.g., Odean,
1998), is underestimating the variance of continuous private signals. In this subsection,
we brieﬂy demonstrate how our model can be reformulated to represent overconﬁdence in
this way. For brevity, we only sketch the main details of a simple case that is analogous
to the perfect correlation case (ρ = 1).
Let the random variable 0 < σq ∼ fq be the variance of the public signal, and for each
i ∈ I let the random variable 0 < σpi ∼ fp be the variance of the private signal of
agent i (where fq and fp are continuous distributions, and the variables
(
σq, (σpi)i∈I
)
are
independent). All agents publicly receive σq. Let Rq ∼ norm (0, σq) and for each i ∈ I
let Rpi ∼ norm (0, σpi). At the ﬁrst stage of the interaction the principal chooses a bias
proﬁle for the agents: (gi)i∈I . Each function gi : R+ → R+ describes the bias function of
agent i relative to the private signal. That is, agent i is privately misinformed that the
value of σpi is gi (σpi). At the second stage of the interaction, each agent chooses one of
two actions: {aguidelines, aoriginal}. If agent i chooses aguidelines (aoriginal) then his payoﬀ is
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−R2q
(
−R2pi
)
. The payoﬀ of the principal is a concave increasing function of the average
payoﬀ of the agents. Similar to Theorem 3, one can show that there is a unique ﬁrst-best
homogeneous optimal bias proﬁle which represents overconﬁdence: g∗ (σpi) < σpi .
A Proofs
A.1 Preliminaries
The following lemma presents an equivalent formulation for the decreasing absolute risk
aversion property, which will be used in the proofs of Theorem 3 (part 3) and Theorem 6.
Lemma 11 Let h (y) be a strictly concave increasing function. Then h (y) satisﬁes
(strictly) decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) if and only if fa (y) =
h′(y)
h′(y+a) is a
strictly decreasing function of y for each a > 0.
PROOF. The lemma is proven as follows:
h (y) satisﬁes DARA ⇔ for every y, a > 0:
rA (y) > rA (y + a)⇔ −h
′′ (y)
h′ (y)
> −h
′′ (y + a)
h′ (y + a)
⇔ h
′′ (y)
h′ (y)
<
h′′ (y + a)
h′ (y + a)
⇔ h′′ (y) · h′ (y + a)− h′′ (y + a) · h′ (y) < 0
⇔ f ′a (y) =
h′′ (y) · h′ (y + a)− h′′ (y + a) · h′ (y)
(h′ (y + a))2
< 0
⇔ fa (y) is strictly decreasing. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 There exists a unique optimal bias function g∗, which induces the ﬁrst-best
payoﬀ, with the following properties:
(1) g∗ (p) > p for every 0 < p < 1 (overconﬁdence).
(2) g∗ is continuous.
(3) g∗ is increasing: dg
∗(p)
dp
> 0 for every 0 < p < 1, g∗ (0) = 0, and g∗ (1) = 1.
(4) g∗ does not depend on the distribution fq.
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PROOF. The proof includes two parts. The ﬁrst part shows that the ﬁrst-best out-
come of the principal can be approximately induced by a bias function. The second part
characterizes this optimal bias function g∗, and shows its uniqueness.
Approximating the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ by a bias function
We begin by dealing with the ﬁrst-best case in which the principal receives all the
private signals (pi)i∈I and the public signal q and chooses the actions of all the agents.
Without loss of generality the ﬁrst-best strategy is a function φ that chooses a threshold
p = φ (q, p1, ..., pn), such that each agent i with higher (lower) accuracy level pi ≥ p
(pi < p) follows his personal judgment (accepted guidelines). The expected payoﬀ (u) of
this threshold is:
E
(
h
(
L+ (H − L)
(
1
n
(# {i|pi < p and ξi,q = 1}+ # {i|pi ≥ p and ξi,p = 1})
))
|q, (pi)i∈I
)
.
Variables (ξi,q, ξi,p)i∈I are conditionally independent given ξq. Assuming that the number
of agents is large enough, the expected payoﬀ is well approximated by
u = P (ξq = 1) · h
L+ H − L
n
·
∑
pi<p
P (ξi,q = 1|ξq = 1) +
∑
pi≥p
P (ξi,p = 1)
+
P (ξq = 0) · h
L+ H − L
n
·
∑
pi<p
P (ξi,q = 1|ξq = 0) +
∑
pi≥p
P (ξi,p = 1)
+ o () .
Substituting the diﬀerent probabilities yields the following:
u = q · h
L+ H − L
n
·
(√ρ+ (1−√ρ) · q) ·# {i|pi < p}+ ∑
pi≥p
pi
+
(1− q) · h
L+ H − L
n
·
((1−√ρ) · q) ·# {i|pi < p}+ ∑
pi≥p
pi
+ o () .
To simplify notation let f = fp and F = Fp. Assuming again that the number of agents
is large enough, one can approximate the empirical distribution of the private signals
(p1, ..., pn) by their prior distribution f . This gives the following approximation:
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u = q · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
(
√
ρ+ (1−√ρ) · q) · F (p) +
ˆ 1
p
x · f (x) dx
))
+ (A.1)
(1− q) · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
((1−√ρ) · q) · F (p) +
ˆ 1
p
x · f (x) dx
))
+ o () .
Consider the bias function g∗ (p) that is deﬁned as follows: p = (g∗)−1 (q) is the threshold
that maximizes Eq. A.1 (neglecting the error term o ()). By the above arguments, such
a bias function -induces the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ.
Characterizing the unique optimal bias function g∗ (p)
We now calculate the value of p = (g∗)−1 (q) that maximizes Eq. A.1 (neglecting the error
term o ()). One can verify that g∗ (0) = 0 and g∗ (1) = 1. We focus on the case 0 < q < 1.
Observe ﬁrst that the optimal p must be in the interval
((
1−√ρ
)
· q, q
)
because: (1)
following aguidelines strictly dominates following aoriginal when pi ≤
(
1−√ρ
)
· q, as the
former is better than the latter even in the bad state of nature (in which ξq = 0); and
(2) following aoriginal strictly dominates aguidelines when pi > q as it yields a 2nd-order
stochastic dominant payoﬀ.
To simplify notation let:
Ap,q,ρ = ((1−√ρ) · q) · F (p) +
ˆ 1
p
x · f (x) dx.
Observe the following properties of Ap,q,ρ:
(1) Ap,q,ρ is strictly decreasing in p in the interval
((
1−√ρ
)
· q, q
)
(because dAp,q,ρ
dp
=((
1−√ρ
)
· q − p
)
· f (p) is negative for every p >
(
1−√ρ
)
· q).
(2) Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ ·F (p) is strictly increasing in p in the interval
((
1−√ρ
)
· q, q
)
(because
d
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
)
dp
= ((1−√ρ) · q +√ρ− p)·f (p) > ((1−√ρ) · q +√ρ · q − p)·f (p)
is positive for every p < q .
(3) Ap,q,ρ is weakly increasing in q (strictly increasing when ρ < 1).
(4) Ap,q,ρ is strictly decreasing in ρ.
(5) Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p) is strictly increasing in ρ.
For every 0 < q < 1 we ﬁnd p = (g∗)−1 (q) by derivation:
du
dp
= q · h′ (L+ (H − L) · (√ρ · F (p) + Ap,q,ρ)) (((1−√ρ) · q +√ρ− p) f (p)) (H − L)
+ (1− q) · h′ (L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ) (((1−√ρ) · q − p) f (p)) (H − L) .
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Assuming an internal solution (du
dp
= 0) yields:
h′ (L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ)
h′
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
)) = q ·
(√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q − p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
) . (A.2)
Using the strict concavity of h, the fact that Ap,q,ρ is strictly decreasing in p and Ap,q,ρ +√
ρ · F (p) is strictly increasing in p in the interval
((
1−√ρ
)
· q, q
)
implies that the
left-hand side (l.h.s.) of Eq. A.2 is a strictly increasing function of p. Observe that the
right-hand side (r.h.s.) is a strictly decreasing function of p, and that for p close enough
to
(
1−√ρ
)
· q the r.h.s. is larger than the l.h.s. (as the r.h.s. converges to ∞ when p
converges to
(
1−√ρ
)
· q), while for p close enough to q the l.h.s. is larger than the r.h.s.
(as the r.h.s. converges to 1 when p converges to q while the l.h.s. is always larger than
1). Thus for each 0 < q < 1 there is a unique solution p = (g∗)−1 (q) to Eq. A.2 in the
interval
((
1−√ρ
)
· q, q
)
, which is a continuous function of q. In particular, this implies
that (g∗)−1 (q) < q for every 0 < q < 1 (the overconﬁdence property).
By Lemma 11, the l.h.s. of Eq. A.2 is weakly decreasing in q (as Ap,q,ρ is weakly increasing
in q). One can verify that the r.h.s. is strictly increasing in q. Thus increasing q by δ > 0
while holding p constant, would make the r.h.s. larger than the l.h.s., and p must be
increased in order to retain the equality in Eq. A.2. This implies that (g∗)−1 (q + δ) >
(g∗)−1 (q) for every 0 < q < 1 and 1 − q > δ > 0, and because of this, (g∗)−1 (q) is a
strictly increasing function of q.
One can verify that du
dp
> 0 for every p < (g∗)−1 (q), and du
dp
< 0 for every p > (g∗)−1 (q).
Thus, any other bias threshold p 6= (g∗)−1 (q) would yield a strictly lower expected payoﬀ.
The above arguments show that the proﬁle in which all agents have bias g∗ induces
(up to ) the ﬁrst-best outcome for the principal (and thus it is -optimal), that g∗ has
all the required properties (overconﬁdence, continuous, and increasing), and that g∗ is
unique in the following sense: any other bias function g˜ such that g˜ 6= g∗ on a set with a
positive Lebesgue measure yields a strictly lower payoﬀ, assuming the number of agents
is suﬃciently large. Observe (Eq. A.2), that g∗ (p) does not depend on the distribution
fq. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Let (gi)i∈I be an heterogeneous proﬁle. Then there is k0 ∈ N such that
for every k ≥ k0, there is an homogeneous proﬁle that induces a strictly better outcome
than (gi)i∈I in the game with k · |I| agents.
PROOF. Let g˜ be the following bias function (homogeneous bias proﬁle): for each q ∈
[0, 1], (g˜) (q)−1 is the unique solution to the following equation:
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F
(
(g˜)−1 (q)
)
=
∑
i∈I
1
|I|
(
F
(
g−1i (q)
))
That is, g˜ is a bias function that averages the heterogeneous proﬁle (gi)i∈I . Fix any
0 < q < 1 satisfying mini (gi)
−1 (q) < maxi (gi)
−1 (q). To simplify notation let pi = g−1i (q)
and p˜ = g˜−1 (q). By the arguments given in the previous subsection, for each q, the
expected payoﬀ of the heterogeneous proﬁle (gi)i∈N in the game with k · |I| agents (for
large enough k) is approximately given by
q · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
(
(
√
ρ+ (1−√ρ) · q) · F (pi) +
ˆ 1
pi
x · f (x) dx
)))
+
(1− q) · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
(
((1−√ρ) · q) · F (pi) +
ˆ 1
pi
x · f (x) dx
)))
,
and the expected payoﬀ of the homogeneous proﬁle g˜ is approximately given by
q · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
(
√
ρ+ (1−√ρ) · q) · F (p˜) +
ˆ 1
p˜
x · f (x) dx
))
+
(1− q) · h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
((1−√ρ) · q) · F (p˜) +
ˆ 1
p˜
x · f (x) dx
))
.
As F (p˜) =
∑
i∈I
1
|I| (F (p˜i)), the homogeneous proﬁle yields a higher expected payoﬀ if
and only if
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
ˆ 1
pi
xf (x) dx <
ˆ 1
p˜
xf (x) dx.
This is equivalent to
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
(ˆ 1
pi
xf (x) dx−
ˆ 1
p˜
xf (x) dx
)
< 0,
or equivalently (using the notation that
´ b
a
f (x) dx = − ´ a
b
f (x) dx when b < a):
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
ˆ p˜
pi
xf (x) dx < 0,
which holds if and only if
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1n
∑
i∈I
(F (p˜)− F (pi)) · E (p|min (pi, p˜) ≤ p ≤ max (pi, p˜)) < 0. (A.3)
Observe that
1
n
∑
i∈I
(F (p˜)− F (pi)) = 0,
and that E (p|min (pi, p˜) ≤ p ≤ max (pi, p˜)) is strictly increasing in pi and strictly de-
creasing in (F (p˜)− F (pi)). This implies that Inequality A.3 holds.
The above arguments show that for each q such that mini (gi)
−1 (q) < maxi (gi)
−1 (q),
g˜ has higher expected value than (gi)i∈I , conditional on q = q. The fact that (gi)i∈I
is a heterogeneous bias proﬁle (i.e., that mini (gi)
−1 (q) < maxi (gi)
−1 (q) in a set with
positive Lebesgue measure), implies that g˜ has higher expected value than (gi)i∈I (without
conditioning on the value of q). By the law of large numbers, if the number of agents is
suﬃciently large then it implies that with high probability g˜ induces a strictly larger
payoﬀ than (gi)i∈I . 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 Let (I1, ρ1, fq,1, fp,1, L1, H1, h1) and (I2, ρ2, fq,2, fp,2, L2, H2, h2) be two sets
of parameters of our model, and let g∗1 (g
∗
2) be the unique optimal bias function given the
ﬁrst (second) set of parameters. Then g∗1 presents more overconﬁdence (g
∗
1 (p) > g
∗
2 (p)
for every 0 < p < 1) in each of the following cases:
(1) Utility h1 is more risk-averse than h2 and all other parameters are the same. That
is, h1 = ψ ◦ h2 where ψ is concave and increasing.
(2) The ﬁrst correlation coeﬃcient is larger (ρ1 > ρ2), and all other parameters are the
same.
PROOF.
(1) Let h2 = h and let h1 = ψ ◦ h where ψ is concave and increasing. Substituting ψ ◦ h
as the principal's utility in Eq. (A.2) yields the following equation:
Ψ′ (h (L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ)) · h′ (L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ)
Ψ′
(
h
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
)))
h′
(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
))
=
q ·
(√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q − p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
) . (A.4)
Let (p, q2) be any solution to Eq. (A.2): q2 = g
∗
2 (p). We now substitute (p, q2) in Eq.
A.4. Observe that the l.h.s. of Eq. (A.4) is larger than the l.h.s. of Eq. (A.2) due to
the concavity of ψ, while the r.h.s. of both equations are the same. This implies that
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with the values of (p, q2), the l.h.s. is larger then the the r.h.s. of Eq. (A.4). Recall
that the l.h.s is weakly decreasing in q (due to Lemma 11) while the r.h.s. is strictly
increasing in q. This implies that q1 = g
∗
1 (p) > q2.
(2) Let (p, q2) be any solution to Eq. (A.2) given ρ2: q2 = g
∗
2 (p). Observe that: (1) The
r.h.s. of Eq. (A.2) is strictly decreasing in ρ, and (2) the concavity of h implies that
the l.h.s. of Eq. (A.2) is strictly increasing in ρ (recall that Ap,q,ρ is strictly decreasing
in ρ, while Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ ·F (p) is strictly increasing in ρ). Thus, given ρ1, p and q2, the
l.h.s. is strictly larger than the r.h.s. As the l.h.s is decreasing in q and the r.h.s. is
strictly increasing in q, it implies that: q1 = g
∗
1 (p) > q2. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7 Assume that the principal has a CRRA utility function. Then,
(1) g∗ depends on the payoﬀs only through its dependency on the potential gain D =
(H − L) /L.
(2) If D1 > D2 (and all other parameters are the same) then g
∗
1 presents more overcon-
ﬁdence (g∗1 (p) > g
∗
2 (p) for every 0 < p < 1).
(3) If distribution fp,2 has a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance over fp,1 (and all other
parameters are the same) then g∗1 presents more overconﬁdence.
(4) The ratio between the perceived error probability and the true error probability of
personal judgment (1−g(p)
1−p ) converges to (1/ (D + 1))
φ =
(
L
H
)φ
when both p and ρ
converge to 1.
PROOF.
(1) Placing h′ (x) = x−φ in Eq. (A.2) yields:
(L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ)−φ(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
))−φ = q ·
((√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
− p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)) ⇒

(
L+ (H − L) ·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
))
L+ (H − L) · Ap,q,ρ
φ = q ·
((√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
− p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)) ⇒

(
L
L
+ H−L
L
·
(
Ap,q,ρ +
√
ρ · F (p)
))
L
L
+ H−L
L
· Ap,q,ρ
φ = q ·
((√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
− p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)) ⇒
(
1 +
H−L
L
· √ρ · F (p)
1 + H−L
L
· Ap,q,ρ
)φ
=
q ·
((√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
− p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)) .
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Substituting D = H−L
L
and Ap,q,ρ =
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F (p) + ´ 1
p
x · f (x) dx gives
1 + D · √ρ · F (p)
1 +D
(((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F (p) + ´ 1
p
x · f (x) dx
)
φ = q ·
((√
ρ+
(
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
− p
)
(1− q) ·
(
p−
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)) .
(A.5)
This proves that the g∗ depends on the payoﬀs only through its dependence on D.
(2) Observe that the l.h.s. of Eq. (A.5) increases in D. Similar to the arguments in the
proof of Theorem 6, this implies that larger D induces more overconﬁdence.
(3) Let fp,2 be a distribution with ﬁrst order stochastic dominance over fp,1. That is,
F2 (p) < F1 (p) for every 0 < p < 1. We have to show that g
∗
1 ≥ g∗2. Observe that the
l.h.s. of Eq. (A.5) is larger when fp,1 replaces fp,2. This is because1 + D · √ρ · F2 (p)
1 +D
(((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F2 (p) +
´ 1
p
x · f (x) dx
)
φ =
1 + D · √ρ · F2 (p)
1 +D
(((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F2 (p) +
´ 1
p
(1− F2 (x)) dx
)
φ =
1 +
1 +D
(((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F2 (p) +
´ 1
p
(1− F2 (x)) dx
)
D · √ρ · F2 (p)
−1

φ
=
1 +
D
((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
· F2 (p)
D · √ρ · F2 (p) +
1 +D
´ 1
p
(1− F2 (x)) dx
D · √ρ · F2 (p)
−1

φ
≤
1 +

((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
√
ρ
+
1 +D
´ 1
p
(1− F2 (x)) dx
D · √ρ · F1 (p)
−1

φ
≤
1 +

((
1−√ρ
)
· q
)
√
ρ
+
1 +D
´ 1
p
(1− F1 (x)) dx
D · √ρ · F1 (p)
−1

φ
.
Similar to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 6, g∗1 (p) ≥ g∗2 (p) for every p.
(4) Let both p and ρ converge to 1 (which implies that q also converges to 1). Substituting
it in Eq. (A.5) yields (approximately)
(
H
L
)φ
= (1 +D)φ ≈ (1− p)
(1− q) ,
and that completes the proof. 
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 8 For each n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 2 the principal can induce a strictly better
outcome when the number of agents is k · n than when it is n.
PROOF. Let (gi)i∈I be a bias proﬁle in the game with n = |I| agents. Recall that for
each agent i ∈ I, ui is the random payoﬀ of agent i with bias function gi, and that the
principal's payoﬀ is h
(
1
n
∑
i∈I ui
)
. Consider (gi)i∈I as a proﬁle in the game with k · n
agents (where each k agents share one of the bias functions gi). This proﬁle induces the
following payoﬀ:
h
 1
n
∑
i∈I
1
k
k∑
j=1
u(i−1)·k+j
 ,
where for each i, the variables
{(
u(i−1)·k+j
)
j=1,...,k
, ui
}
are identically distributed. Observe
that 1
n
∑
i∈I 1k
∑k
j=1 u(i−1)·k+j second-order stochastically strictly dominates
1
n
∑
i∈I ui. By
the concavity of h, it implies that the principal strictly prefers the outcome in the game
with k · n agents. Thus, any outcome in the game with n agents is strictly dominated by
an outcome in the game with k · n agents. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Proposition 10 The extended model with costly signals admits a unique optimal bias
function g∗, which is the same as the optimal bias function g∗ of the basic model with
fp = fpt .
PROOF. We begin by calculating the ﬁrst-best proﬁle in a game with many agents
n >> 1. Without loss of generality for each q ∈ [0, 1], there is some eﬀectiveness value
t0 = α (q) such that the optimal payoﬀ can be induced by all agents using the same
threshold strategy: (1) agents with low eﬀectiveness (ti < t0) do not invest any eﬀort and
follow the accepted guidelines, and (2) agents with high eﬀectiveness (ti ≥ t0) invest some
eﬀort and follow personal judgment.
Consider an agent with high eﬀectiveness: t ≥ t0. His expected payoﬀ from investing eﬀort
e is L+ (H − L) · (p (e, t)− e). This is maximized in e∗t that satisﬁes d(p(e,t))de = 1 (a unique
maximizer exists due to the strict concavity of p (e, t)). Let p∗t = p (e
∗
t , t). For large enough
n, if all agents with high eﬀectiveness invest eﬀort e∗t , it -maximizes the principal's payoﬀ
(by the law of large numbers).
Let p0 = p
∗
t0
be the success probability of an agent with threshold eﬀectiveness value t0.
The choice of an optimal threshold t0 is equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding the optimal
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threshold p0 in Theorem 3. Thus the unique optimal bias function g
∗ of the basic model
(Section 3) is also optimal and unique in the extended model (with fp = fpt). 
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